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Abstract
This article offers a distinctive way of grounding the regulative duties held by social media
companies (SMCs). One function of the democratic state is to provide what we term the right
to democratic epistemic participationwithin the public sphere. But social media has transformed
our public sphere, such that SMCs now facilitate citizens’ right to democratic epistemic partici-
pation and do so on a scale that was previously impossible. We argue that this role of SMCs in
expanding the scope of what counts as fair democratic epistemic participation, and in becoming
the providers of access to the digital public sphere, brings with it duties of regulation.
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Introduction
THE PUBLIC SPHERE is the space in which
people express opinions and exchange views
about what is going on in their society. Within
democratic societies, enabling access to a well-
constituted public sphere is recognised as one
of the functions of the state: as Jürgen Haber-
mas claims, access to this ‘realm of our social
life … is guaranteed to all citizens’.1 This arti-
cle will refer to this activity—that is, expres-
sing opinions, lending support to or
contesting others’ views, gaining knowledge
in order to become informed as a citizen, and
so on—as democratic epistemic participation (or
epistemic participation for short). Citizens
should be able to access a broad range of
opportunities for epistemic participation
within the public sphere and thus, democratic
states plausibly have a duty to protect and
enable such participation.
Social media has transformed the public
sphere. In short, many of the practices and
institutions comprising this shared space are
now digital.2 For many across the world,
Twitter and Facebook have become their main
civic fora, with internet users spending nearly
2.5 hours on average on social media sites each
day, and recent Ofcom studies showing that
nearly half of the UK population use social
media to keep up with the latest news stories.3
Importantly then, social media facilitates citi-
zens’ epistemic participation within this new
digital public sphere, and in fact does so on a
scale that was previously impossible. Whereas
before, individuals had to either rely on or cre-
ate collective bodies to represent their voices
en masse, they can now speak their own minds
directly to the world, in principle at least. This
is only possible because social media compa-
nies (SMCs) now exist as such powerful insti-
tutions within the public sphere.
That social media structures the new public
sphere is well recognised, but less well
recognised—and the focus of this discussion—
1J. Habermas, ‘The public sphere: an encyclopedia
article (1964)’, New German Critique, vol. 3, 1974,
pp. 49–55, at p. 49.
2J. M. Balkin, ‘How to regulate (and not regulate)
social media’, Knight Institute Occasional Paper Series
1, 2020; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3484114 (accessed 24 May 2021).
3Statista, ‘Daily time spent on social networking by
internet users worldwide from 2012 to 2020’;
https://www.statista.com/statistics/433871/daily-
social-media-usage-worldwide/; Ofcom, ‘Half of
people now get their news from social media’, 2019;
https://www.ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/latest/
features-and-news/half-of-people-get-news-from-
social-media; Ofcom, ‘News consumption in the
UK: slight reduction (from 49% to 45% in 2020)’,
August 2020; https://www.ofcom.org.uk/research-
and-data/tv-radio-and-on-demand/news-media/
news-consumption (all accessed 24 May 2021).
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are two interconnected claims implied by this
fact. The first claim is that the emergence of
social media has expanded the scope of what
counts as fair democratic epistemic participation;
this now entails an equal opportunity for citizens
to participate in the expanded public sphere
offered online. The second claim is that demo-
cratic states have as a result, knowingly or other-
wise, effectively outsourced the provision of fair
epistemic participation in the public sphere to
SMCs who provide the platforms for doing this.
What follows from this is a third claim: that SMCs
have duties of regulationwith regard to epistemic
participation in the public sphere.
The aim in this article is to demonstrate the
first and second claims, and to show that
acceptance of these claims grounds the regula-
tory duties referenced in the third claim.
Indeed, SMCs have implicitly recognised this
conclusion. As such, the article aims to show
that our formal understanding of the role of
SMCs simply needs to adapt to the actual role
they now play in the democratic fabric of mod-
ern states. As set out in the next section, it is
suggested that this way of grounding SMCs’
duties in the right to democratic epistemic par-
ticipation offers a better option than the cur-
rently dominant route, which seeks to justify
regulatory duties by reference to concerns
relating to truth.
Where (not) to look
The legal scholar Jack Balkin posits that social
media have threemain functionswithin thepub-
lic sphere: (1) to facilitate public participation in cul-
ture, politics, art, and so on; (2) to organise public
conversation so that people can easily find and
communicate with each other; and (3) to curate
public opinion, both through SMCs’ personalised
presentation of information on feeds (as he puts
it, by ‘regulating the speed of propagation and
the reach of content’) and through the enforce-
ment of community standards and terms of ser-
vice.4 Our argument will flow from the first of
these functions, which is considered to be the
most basic and uncontroversial.
In recent years, though, attention has pri-
marily been directed towards the appropriate
way for SMCs to carry out the third, curational
function. This discussion is especially pressing
in the light of the prevalence ofmisinformation
and disinformation circulating in the digital
public sphere and the impact of this on demo-
cratic decisions. The worry here is clear: we
need to be able to access accurate information
about aspects of the world that affect our lives
and interests as citizens, so that we can form
beliefs on the basis of this information about
matters as crucial as vaccinating our children
or ourselves, how to cast our vote in the next
election or referendum, and so on. The prob-
lem, however, is that it is difficult to know
which information is accurate andwho to trust
epistemically while navigating our way
through an ‘epistemically polluted’ online
environment.5 The question that has been
asked, then, is what SMCs should be doing to
regulate against (the spread of) these kinds of
epistemic pollutants. This is clearly a very
important question, and there has been critical
work in this area. An increasingly prominent
way of discussing this issue, in political episte-
mology and beyond, is in terms of epistemic
rights. In the context of mainstream media,
Lani Watson, for instance, argues that individ-
uals in democratic societies have ‘a right to
knowledge, information, understanding and
truth’, and that this right ‘imposes a duty on
the mainstreammedia to provide these episte-
mic goods.’6 On the basis of this, she argues,
for example, that there were systematic episte-
mic rights violations in the media coverage
leading up to the Brexit referendum vote.
But, it is not clear precisely how this type of
argument extends to social media. Plausibly, if
we do have an epistemic right to accurate infor-
mation, SMCs have duties of regulation relating
to misinformation and disinformation—which
may, for example, justify regulatory (curational)
actions such as fact checking, de-emphasising or
taking down content, epistemic nudging (as in
the case of Twitter’s ‘manipulatedmedia’ flags),
and so on.7 However, these claims are heavily
4Balkin, ‘How to regulate’, p. 4.
5S. Ryan, ‘Epistemic environmentalism’, Journal of
Philosophical Research, vol. 43, 2018, pp. 97–112.
6L. Watson, ‘Systematic epistemic rights violations
in the media: a Brexit case study’, Social Epistemol-
ogy, vol. 32, no. 2, 2018, pp. 88–102, at p. 92.
7M. Adams and F. Niker, ‘Harnessing the epistemic
value of crises for just ends’, in F. Niker and
A. Bhattacharya, eds., Political Philosophy in a Pan-
demic: Routes to a More Just Future, London, Blooms-
bury Academic, 2021.
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contested, precisely because of the distinctive
nature of SMCs as facilitators, rather than as pro-
ducers of information and other epistemic goods
(as discussed more fully below). While argu-
ments exist for the democratic duties of those
agents of the press who create content, and are
seen as fulfilling a vital democratic duty
(namely, that of protecting citizens from state
misinformation and silence with regard to
important matters), the same is harder to claim
with regard to SMCs, who do no such thing
and make no claims to do so.
We should, therefore, start with the funda-
mental and distinctive role played by social
media, in the first instance at least, when look-
ing for the principle(s) that specify and ground
SMCs’ duties of regulation. To put it another
way: the focus has been on seeking to justify
regulatory duties by reference to concerns
relating to truth; but we believe that we can
get a better grasp on what grounds these
duties—both the self-regulative duties of
SMCs and the regulative oversight by
states—by starting with democratic epistemic
participation, which SMCs uniquely facilitate.
The right to democratic epistemic
participation
The first main function of social media, as
noted above, is to facilitate participation in
the public sphere. As Twitter CEO, Jack Dor-
sey, puts it: ‘People see Twitter as a public
square, and therefore they have expectations
that they would have of a public square.’8 A
key component of this is the facilitation of
reciprocal epistemic participation in the forma-
tion of public opinion, which is the focus here.
Whereas others have introduced the category
of epistemic rights as a way of potentially
grounding regulatory duties, this article pro-
poses the right to democratic epistemic participa-
tion as fundamental to the debate. This is
understood as a right to participate on a fair
footingwithin epistemic practices in the public
sphere. This right is often violated in practice,
but this article deals with the principle.
What kind of right is this? Does it, for
instance, fall into the category of epistemic
rights, mentioned above? It is not clear where
the boundaries of epistemic rights may be,
but we don’t want or need to claim that the
right to epistemic participation is an epistemic
right.9 Rather, it is enough to say that it is a
moral right held by those within democratic
states. We might ground this right in different
ways: in fair epistemic participation being
intrinsic either to human flourishing or to
social personhood, or in some other claims
around equality within a democracy, or in
the value of epistemic agency in its own
right.10 However it is grounded, we claim that
it is the duty of the democratic state either to
provide this right or to ensure that it is
provided.
A second question about the nature of this
right is how it relates to the moral right to free-
dom of speech. Although ‘free speech’ is a con-
tested concept, it is fair to say that many of its
advocates and critics alike understand it in
terms of the negative freedom to hold opinions
and to articulate these opinions and ideas
without interference or fear of censorship or
legal sanction by public authority.11 The focus
here on democratic epistemic participation is
broader than this, in two ways. First, the right
to epistemic participation involves a positive
right to the provision of equal access for citizens
to enable them to engage in critical democratic
epistemic activities, not just a freedom from
state interference in their freedom to speak.
While this may be in the scope of what some
8B. Hiatt, ‘Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey: the Rolling
Stone interview’, Rolling Stone, 23 January 2019;
https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-
features/twitter-ceo-jack-dorsey-rolling-stone-
interview-782298/ (accessed 31 March 2021).
9For more on the idea of epistemic rights, see Lani
Watson, The Right to Know: Epistemic Rights and
Why We Need Them, London, Routledge, 2021.
10M. Fricker, ‘Epistemic contribution as a central
human capability’, in G. Hull, ed., The Equal Society:
Essays on Equality in Theory and Practice, Maryland,
Lexington Books, 2015, pp. 73–89. L. Smith, ‘The
right to press freedom of expression vs the rights of
marginalised groups: an answer grounded in per-
sonhood rights’, in M. Garcia-Godinez, R. Mellin
and R. Tuomela, eds., Social Ontology, Normativity
and Law, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2020, pp. 79–96. C. Z.
Elgin, ‘Epistemic agency’, Theory and Research in
Education, no. 11, 2013, pp. 135–152; M. Congdon,
‘“Knower” as an ethical concept: from epistemic
agency to mutual recognition’, Feminist Philosophy
Quarterly, no. 4, 2018, pp. 1–26.
11See, for example, Article 10 of UK Human Rights
Act 1998.
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understand as ‘free speech’, it is far from
agreed upon by all advocates of the principle.
Second, the right requires the opportunity for
reciprocal engagement in epistemic exchange
and opinion formation, rather than merely a
unidirectional ability to speak out, as freedom
of speech implies.
The emphasis, then, is not only on there
being no state restrictions on free speech, or
even on the provision of a platform enabling
free speech. Rather, the value of a public
sphere is to enable the forming of ‘public opin-
ion’ in its broadest sense, and the right to dem-
ocratic epistemic participation is the right to
take part in that process on an equal footing.
For those who do believe that this scope
exactly coincides with the scope of ‘free
speech’ claims, they are welcome to interpret
this claim in those terms. However, we believe
that many who are less keen to associate these
more positive claimswith free speechwill never-
theless recognise that where there are epistemic
goods essential to democratic participation,
there is a demand to ensure equally fair (if not
outcome-equal) access to those democratic epi-
stemic goods, and that these goods go beyond
the mere provision of freedom from state inter-
ference. We suggest that the right to democratic
epistemic participation encompasses those
goods. It is a right held by the citizens of demo-
cratic states and in principle held equally by all
citizens.
Social media and the right to
epistemic participation
With the right to epistemic participation on the
table, we now need to ask how social media’s
remaking of the public sphere has affected
the provision and scope of this right.
What is distinctive about social media, rela-
tive to mainstream media, is their fundamen-
tally participatory nature. It is a difference that
relates to the production of epistemic goods:
in the mainstreammedia, professionals—jour-
nalists, editors, and so on—produce informa-
tion and knowledge for consumption by
citizens. By contrast, those working for SMCs
do not produce any epistemic content, but
rather, provide a platform for their users to
create their own content and to consume,
share, and engage with others’ content. This
distinct role of SMCs in providing
opportunities for participation within a shared
epistemic community is one which SMC chiefs
such as Dorsey recognise and endorse:
I think the real interestingness of Twitter is not
us. It was the fact that wewere able to see what
people are doing with it and made it more
accessible. I think the true inventions were
not the initial stuff. It was the @ symbol. It
was the # symbol. It was the retweet … Our
role there was observing that people were
actually trying to communicate with one
another. I think that is the greatest role we
had.12
This quote draws attention not only to the
fact that users interpreted Twitter as a forum
for participating in reciprocal communicative
practices, regardless of the intent of the crea-
tors, but also to the role that Twitter played
in facilitating this. Twitter acted on those par-
ticipants’ actions, embracing their own role
as facilitators of the epistemic community. At
base, then, social media are concerned with
the provision of participation (understood as
involving contribution, creation, and extrac-
tion of information) in the epistemic commu-
nity. And this is a role willingly embraced by
both participants and SMCs.
Consequently, just as the traditional press
facilitate citizens’ rights to have access to news
and accurate information, and schools facili-
tate citizens’ rights to education, SMCs have
become the facilitators of individuals’ right to
be treated equally as epistemic participants (all
else being equal or notwithstanding) within
democratic states. In so doing, SMCs fulfil a
role in the functioning of the democratic state,
just as these other parties do: by facilitating
participation in the public sphere, SMCs facili-
tate democratic participation in the formation
of, and access to, public opinion. This relates
to the epistemic bases of democratic citizen-
ship in a different way to citizens’ entitlement
to accurate information in mainstream media;
it concerns citizens’ equal entitlement to par-
ticipate in and shape the creation of social
beliefs, opinions, and knowledge within their
society.
Importantly, SMCs have not only become
the facilitators of this right; their very existence
has re-shaped what the opportunity for
12Hiatt, Dorsey interview.
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democratic epistemic participation looks like.
Prior to the advent of social media, an average
individual’s ability to exercise this right was,
in practice, restricted to participation in episte-
mic interactions within a fairly limited sphere
of influence, or to being represented by a col-
lective in certain ways (through activist
groups, or political parties, for example).
Within the digital public sphere, these individ-
uals are not restricted in these ways to any-
where near the same degree. Although it’s
true that factors such as celebrity, wealth and
power affect the amplification of one’s voice
on social media, it is also true that anyone
can go viral. We now have the capacity to par-
ticipate epistemically as individuals, expres-
sing our own voices and indicating our
support for assertions and claims publicly on
a relatively equal footing. In other words,
SMCs have extended the reach of the equal
right to democratic epistemic participation—
which, in itself, is a good thing, given the
potential to democratise expression and diver-
sify public discourse.
Our first claim, then, is that social media
have expanded the scope of fair democratic epi-
stemic participation, since the existence of
SMCs means that this now includes an equal
opportunity for citizens to participate in the
new, expanded public sphere offered online.
State duties, facilitated through
corporate agents
The state ultimately bears the duty to protect
and enable the rights of citizens to participate
in the creation of ideas, beliefs and knowledge,
including the ability to access the epistemic
inputs of others. This is fundamental for the
purposes of meeting the (human) rights of cit-
izens to epistemic goods such as education, as
well as for the maintenance of an informed cit-
izenry. Such a duty, however, can and often is
fulfilled primarily through the delegation of
provision of the right to ‘corporate’ agents
(understood as collective bodies of all kinds).
Such agencies are, as a result, supported and
overseen by democratic states, at a minimum
through not obstructing provision, but also
through the state’s capacity as both a permission-
grantingandregulatorybody.
In a well-functioning democracy, for exam-
ple, the print press and traditional media
provide access and insight into matters which
interest, affect and concern the citizens of the
state (and those beyond its borders), thereby
enabling citizens to have the capacity to form
accurate beliefs. The press in a well-
functioning democracy are granted the free-
dom to do this, unhindered by the threat of
arbitrary silencing or retaliation by powerful
state, corporate, or individual actors. Simi-
larly, the state ensures the provision of the
right to education by financially supporting
and regulating schools and universities set up
to provide that education. So, those groups
and bodies which facilitate the provision of
these epistemic rights—to accurate informa-
tion and to education, respectively—are
supported by the state in doing so because
they fulfil certain roles in the functioning
democratic state.
If what we’ve argued so far is correct, then
SMCs serve a somewhat analogous role in
democratic societies. SMCs offer a space for
citizens to be involved in and to contribute to
the formation of public opinion, and thus are
key actors in the provision of a citizen’s right
to epistemic participation. It would, in princi-
ple at least, be possible for a state to block
SMCs from operating within their territories;
but in reality, such an option is not available
to a democratic state, partly in virtue of the
point made above that the existence of social
media has expanded the scope of fair episte-
mic participation. What this means is that,
whether knowingly or not, democratic states
have effectively outsourced the provision of epi-
stemic participation in the public sphere to
SMCs. This is the second claim of this article.
On the face of it, the comparison between
SMCs and schools as corporate actors, each
facilitating rights for the state, may appear dis-
analogous: schools are located within states,
and specific states have long histories of deter-
mining the content and delivery of education
within their own boundaries in ways which
may or may not mesh with the provision of
the right to education in other states. In con-
trast, SMCs operate beyond state boundaries
in direct relationships with their users. SMCs’
role in facilitating the right to agential episte-
mic participation is not, therefore, mediated
by the choices of the states in which those citi-
zens reside in any kind of similar way.
However, the relevant point of comparison
between the two is with the facilitation of the
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right itself, rather than the specifics of how
well (or not) states have outsourced that facili-
tation through state policies and control.
The fact that schools are governed by educa-
tion policy within the state does not indicate
that the right to education is whatever the state
determines it to be. Rather, it suggests that it
is entirely possible that states may intervene
in regulating and setting education policy in
ways which support or obstruct the facilitation
of the right to education. What exactly the
right to education requires is outside the scope
of this article but schools would, for example,
no longer be facilitating the right to education
on behalf of the state if they were constrained
by state regulation and education policy in
ways which breached that right. States fulfil
their duty to enable the right to education by
not taking measures that would hinder or pre-
vent the enjoyment of this right.
Similarly, states fulfil part of their duty to
enable the right to democratic epistemic partic-
ipation by not taking measures that would
hinder or prevent the enjoyment of this right.
Blocking SMCs from operating altogether
would be such an act. But, as with ensuring
the rights to education and to accurate infor-
mation in the mainstream media, the demo-
cratic state may also need to fulfil part of its
duty by taking regulatory measures whenever
necessary.
SMCs and duties of regulation
What follows from our analysis for whether
SMCs have regulatory duties for the digital
public sphere, and for what grounds any such
duties? The first thing to note is that we can
distinguish between two sources of duties
with respect to the right to epistemic
participation.
First, there are those duties which every indi-
vidual agent bears to ensure that the exercise
of their right to epistemic participation does
not cause undue harm (epistemic or otherwise)
to others.We can see this particularly clearly in
the case of those who hold epistemic power. A
person in a position of relative power—a
schoolteacher in a classroom, for example—
can epistemically harm her students by pro-
viding inaccurate or unsuitable information.
Her individual right to epistemic participation
in the classroom is bound in this instance by
her duty not to epistemically harm her
students by failing to enable their access to
education, a facilitative provision-right dele-
gated to the school and its members by the
state. Teachers have duties to those they have
particular epistemic power over, grounded in
the role granted to them as the facilitators of
the right to education. But the right to episte-
mic participation may be bounded by any
number of other duties—the general duty not
to incite hatred (in the case of prominent
public figures and hate speech in the media,
for example)—or simply by the duty not to
breach the rights of others to equal democratic
epistemic participation.
Second, there are duties borne by those who
facilitate and enable the right to equal demo-
cratic epistemic participation in the public
sphere. To understand this, first, consider gen-
eral cases of the source of democratic regula-
tory duties. There are, generally, duties borne
by any corporate agent or actor who delivers
or enables citizenship rights for the democratic
state. These are (or at least include) duties of
self-regulation. Consider again the case of the
teacher who epistemically harms her students.
This teacher will be held accountable for harm-
ing her students; she has her own duty not to
harm others through exercising her right
to epistemic participation, as we all do. But it
is the school and school board who hold the
duty to protect their students’ rights to educa-
tion itself, because the school is the provider of
the state-backed right to education. As such,
the school acts as the regulator of this duty
(at least in the first instance). As part of this
regulatory role, the school leadership may
need to, for example, carry out due diligence
when hiring teachers, provide their employees
with relevant training, investigate and
respond to complaints, and so on. If they fail
in this duty, schools may be held liable, and
the state (or the next layer in the structure) will
step in to deal with that failure to regulate
appropriately.
This general case translates to the specific
case of those who facilitate the right to demo-
cratic epistemic participation. Just as the
school has a duty to regulate what teachers
do in the classroom in order to protect stu-
dents’ epistemic rights relating to education,
so too do SMCs have duties to act as the regu-
lator of how users participate on their platform
in order to protect all users’ democratic episte-
mic participation rights. As the facilitators of
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this right through provision of the expanded
public sphere, SMCs have a duty to self-
regulate in order to ensure that this right is
provided equally to all citizens. Precisely what
this may involve will be contextually deter-
mined. But this regulation may include restric-
tions on dissemination, provision of a wider
platform for less powerful epistemic agents,
fact checking at source, penalties for users
who cause harm, and so on. Just as the main-
stream media, for example, self-regulate their
practices in the first instance as the democratic
providers of certain state-backed citizen epi-
stemic rights, SMCs have a duty to do the same
with regard to their specific democratic role as
facilitators of citizens’ right to democratic epi-
stemic participation. And in order to ensure
delivery of this role, SMCs collectively may
also be required to determine a code of practice
and penalty process as a body; again, just as
corporate members of the traditional press
have done. This should not be a controversial
claim. As Facebook CEO, Mark Zuckerberg,
said in his testimony to the US Congress: ‘I
think the real question, as the internet becomes
more important in people’s lives, is what is the
right regulation, not whether there should be
[regulation] or not.’13
However, this regulatory role, in the case of
SMCs and their facilitation of democratic epi-
stemic participation, is more extensive than it
might at first appear. What is distinctive about
social media is how the existence of SMCs
affects the exercise of epistemic participation
rights by the vast majority of users who would
otherwise be in non-influential epistemic posi-
tions. The first duty outlined above, in princi-
ple, attaches to everyone equally. But the vast
majority of citizens are not epistemically
influential in the way the teacher is relative
to her students. Of course, there are some epi-
stemically powerful agents who now also use
social media and, in such cases, the first kind
of duty attaches to the exercise of their episte-
mic participation rights in a straightforward
sense: epistemically powerful actors have
the potential to harm others through their epi-
stemic participation in numerous ways.
SMCs therefore have a duty to regulate this
to prevent harm through exercise of that right
on their platforms.
But SMCs have also changed the capacity of
ordinary citizens to cause harm through exercis-
ing their right to epistemic participation. Before
the existence of SMCs, it would have been very
difficult in practice for the vast majority of ordi-
nary, epistemically non-influential people to
violate their individually-held duty while
exercising their right to epistemic participation,
because they each had relatively little ability to
actually harm others with their epistemic con-
tent. Instead, this duty might be understood as
being minimal, or self-directed; perhaps relating
to being an individually epistemically virtuous
agent, or to adherence with some other norms
of testimonial assertion. And this might imply
that those who facilitate this right have a mini-
mal regulatory role. But, socialmedia have chan-
ged this by transforming the reach of the right to
democratic epistemic participation.
With the rise of social media, all users now
do have the opportunity to violate our individ-
ual duties not to harm others in our exercising
of this right. Crucially, this will only occur
when our individual voices combine with
other voices and/or reach far more people
than they previously could have, or when that
collective of voices negatively affects our indi-
vidual ability to form well-grounded episte-
mic perspectives. SMCs make this
collectively-generated harm possible. For
instance, ‘liking’ and sharing conspiracy theo-
ries and other falsehoods within the digital
public sphere causes active harm (epistemi-
cally and otherwise). Thus, uncoordinated col-
lectives of individuals, when repeating and
sharing the same messages on social media,
can cause harm in ways that non-powerful
individuals in the pre-SMC-facilitated public
sphere simply could not.
It is possible to see more clearly now how
the facilitation of the provision of users’ equal
right to epistemic participation leads to the
problems with respect to truth that we men-
tioned earlier. By enabling so many people
actively to participate in the public sphere,
and by structuring this engagement such that
uncoordinated, networked collectives of indi-
viduals’ engagements can become harmful,
SMCs play a role in facilitating any violation
of further, distinctively epistemic rights, such
as the right to accurate information.
13M. Zuckerberg, Zuckerberg Senate transcript,
10 April 2018; https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/04-10-18%20Zuckerberg%
20Testimony.pdf (accessed 24 May 2021).
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Therefore, two features of social media
ground the regulative duties of SMCs. First
and most straightforward is the fact that epi-
stemically powerful agents not only use SMCs
platforms, but that their voices become even
louder and their reach even wider because of
social media. Any potential harm that these indi-
viduals may do is multiplied as a result of their
exercise of the right of epistemic participation.
SMCs have a regulatory role to play with regard
to these straightforward cases of individual harm.
But the second, more distinctive feature of the
regulatory duties of SMCs, is the fact that the
nature and design of social media platforms
means that even epistemically non-influential
users can cause harmwhen individually innoc-
uous exercises of the right of epistemic partici-
pation merge into a collectively harmful
contribution to the public sphere.
SMCs bear duties of regulation in virtue of
being the facilitators of this (two-part)
increased level of influence in epistemic partic-
ipation. They have these duties owing to their
role as the facilitators of state democratic epi-
stemic participation in the public sphere. And
if they fail in discharging such duties, then, just
as the state may step in when school boards
fail to perform their outsourced regulatory
duties, the state may also step in to hold SMCs
liable or to require greater state involvement in
that regulation.
Conclusion
SMCs, the state, and individuals all appear to
accept and recognise that SMCs have taken
on a facilitatory role within the public sphere.
This article has highlighted how this role
is the facilitation of democratic epistemic partici-
pation rights. The state has a duty to
protect these rights, but the enactment (and
widened reach) of those rights is facilitated
by SMCs. Since we need a well-functioning
public sphere in order to have a well-
functioning democracy, and SMCs provide
access to this sphere, SMCs are now part of
the democratic infrastructure of societies
across theworld. As a result, these bodies have
taken on a role in the democratic state which
few people dispute in practical terms.
This, combined with the increased scope of
fair democratic epistemic participation which
SMCs facilitate, imposes duties of regulation
on SMCs: SMCs are the only ones who argu-
ably have the capacity to act as regulators
for the fair provision of that right within
democratic states. The extent of this duty is
something which they, and to a large extent
citizens and governments, have—so far—
been largely unwilling to recognise or accept
in a formal way. In practice, however, these
duties follow from the claims that SMCs
themselves make with regard to their own role
and status. This role brings a corresponding
regulatory duty.
The question remains how this role ought
to be implemented and governed in practice.
Here we have suggested that, as with other
rights-facilitating corporate bodies, SMCs
themselves ought to be the first port of
call. This may include establishing a self-
regulatory body as a collective of social
media organisations (in much the same way
as the traditional print press have done) in
order to identify rules and appropriate
guidelines. And, just as with other forms of
provision of epistemic and other rights,
states should only step in when SMCs fail
to fulfil this role. What this will look like in
practice is something which states and SMCs
need to define together.
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